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TAXATION OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
UNDER THE ILLINOIS INHERITANCE
TAX LAW
FREDERICK 0. DIcus*
DECISION rendered in 1934 by the Supreme Court
of the State of Illinois dealing with the question of
the taxation of powers of appointment caused considerable confusion among practitioners and fiduciaries as to
the present status of the law.1 The complications created
by this decision, in the light of recent statutory amendments, and by the lack of judicial precedents in this
state have proved somewhat bewildering to those who
by force of circumstances have been confronted with
this problem. It is hoped, therefore, that the following
discussion will clarify the issues involved and suggest
a satisfactory answer to most of the many questions
which have arisen.
We are principally concerned with the question whether
property passing under a power of appointment should
be presently taxed in the estate of the donor, or whether
the tax should be postponed and collected in the estate
of the donee of the power, and if the former is true,
whether the tax should be assessed upon the supposition
of exercise or of non-exercise of the power.
We are confronted at the outset with the necessity of
reviewing thoroughly the cases and statutes in the state
of New York, from which the Illinois Act was adopted
in the first instance, and the amendments to it which
have been followed in many respects in this state. It is
a familiar rule of statutory interpertation that when
a statute is adopted from another state, the legislature
will be presumed to have adopted it in the light of the
judicial construction theretofore placed upon it by the
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1 People v. Linn, 357 Il1. 220, 191 N. E. 450 (1934).
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courts of the foreign state. 2 Because of this legal principle and the relationship between the statutes of Illinois
and New York on this subject, the decisions of the latter
state become singularly important in this discussion.
Obviously it is uncertain, until the exercise or non-exercise of the power, to whom the property will pass. At
common law an appointee was deemed to take the property directly from the donor, although until the appointment was made the appointee remained unknown, or at
least his interest was contingent.' The common law rule,
which still exists in several states, has been abrogated
in most states by statutory provisions regarding the taxation of contingent interests at the highest rate. The
rules developed by the common law were intended to
circumvent another ancient rule that the title to property
could not be held in abeyance.' The donee of the power
merely acted for the donor to the extent of the power
conferred upon him,5 and until the interest over was
finally disposed of by the exercise of the power, the
estates limited upon default of exercise were considered
as vested subject to being divested.6 This brief statement of the common law rules applicable to powers of
appointment is made only as a background for the statutory alterations for tax purposes which are about to be
discussed.
To deal with the present problem more comprehensively, it is wise to consider fully the changes which have
2 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d ed.), sec. 404; People v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 344 Ill. 123, 176 N. E. 305 (1931);
People v. The Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919) ; People
v. Kellogg, 268 Ill. 489, 109 N. E. 304 (1915) ; People v. Carpenter, 264 Ill.
400, 106 N. E. 302 (1914) ; People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168, 99 N. E.
377 (1912) ; People v. Griffith, 245 Ill. 532, 92 N. E. 313 (1910).
3 4 Kent Commentaries (14th ed.), 337; U. S. v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41
S. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed. 617 (1921).
4 Sugden on Powers (8th ed.), Ch. 1, sec. 1.
5 See In re Luques Estate, 114 Me. 235, 95 A. 1021; U. S. v. Field, supra,
n. 3; Kidder, State Inheritance Tax and Taxability of Trusts, p. 41.
6 Sugden on Powers (8th ed.), Ch. 13, p. 622.
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been effected in the New York law. The first provision
in the New York statute for the taxation of powers of appointment appeared in 18971 when section 220 of the
Tax Law was amended to provide for a taxable transfer
resulting from the exercise or non-exercise of the power
in the estate of the donee. This provision, which was
identical with that in Illinois prior to the 1933 amendment, provided as follows:
Whenever any person or corporation shall exercise a power
of appointment derived from any disposition of property, made
either before or after the passage of this chapter, such appointment when made shall be deemed a transfer taxable under the
provisions of this chapter in the same manner as though the
property to which such appointment relates belonged absolutely
to the donee of such power and had been bequeathed or devised
by such donee by will, and whenever any person or corporation
possessing such a power of appointment so derived shall omit or
fail to exercise the same within the time provided therefor, in
whole or in part, a transfer taxable under the provisions of this
chapter shall be deemed to take place to the extent of such omission or failure, in the same manner as though the persons or corporations thereby becoming entitled to the possession or enjoyment of the property to which such power related had succeeded
thereto by a will of the donee of the power failing to exercise the
power, taking effect at the time of such omission or failure.
The first portion of the foregoing section changed the
common law rule" and provided that the exercise of the
power should constitute the transfer deemed to be taxable
under the Act; that is, that the tax should be levied in the
estate of the donee rather than in the estate of the donor
of the power. By force of the statute, the appointee is
deemed to take the property from the donee and not
from the donor for the purposes of taxation, the property passing as part of the donee's estate upon the
exercise of the power.' This provision has been subjected
Laws of 1897, C. 284, p. 150.
8 See n. 5, ante.
9 In re Dimock's Estate, 168 N. Y. S. 584 (1918) ; In re Turner's Estate,
7

222 N. Y. S. 645 (1927).
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to scrutiny on constitutional grounds and has been upheld
repeatedly.1 0 Although, for tax purposes, the transfer
is deemed to be effected by the appointment, still the
title is actually derived from the donor.
'The second portion of section 220 provided that when
there was a failure or omission to exercise the power,
a taxable transfer in the estate of the donee should be
deemed to take place, which again was a statutory alteration of the common law for tax purposes.1 '
The provisions of this section standing alone would
cause no dilemma, and in such cases the taxing authorities would postpone the assessment until the donee of
the power appointed the property or there was a failure
to exercise.1 2 When this portion of the statute is construed in connection with section 230 of the same act,
the legislative intent is not clear, and it is this vexatious
predicament with which we are chiefly concerned.
In 1899 section 230 of the New York Law was amended
to provide:
. . when property is transferred in trust or otherwise, and
the rights, interests or estates of the transferees are dependent
upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly
or in part created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be
imposed upon said transfer at the highest rate which, on the
happening of any of said contingencies or conditions would be
possible under the provisions of this article .... 13
*

10 Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466, 27 S. Ct. 550, 51 L. Ed. 882 (1906),
affirming Matter of Delano, 176 N. Y. 486, 68 N. E. 876, 64 L. R. A. 279
(1903), which reversed 82 App. Div. 147, 81 N. Y. S. 762 (1903) ; Matter
of Potter, 51 App. Div. 212, 64 N. Y. S. 1013 (1900) ; Matter of Vanderbilt,
50 App. Div. 246, 63 N. Y. S. 1079 (1900), affirmed on opinion below, 163
N. Y. 597, 57 N. E. 1127 (1900); Matter of Chauncey, 102 Misc. 378, 168
N. Y. S. 1019 (1918).
11 See Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260, 48 S. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed.
565 (1928) ; Burnham v. Stevens, 212 Mass. 165, 98 N. E. 603 (1912).
12 Under a statute similar to section 220, Massachusetts postpones the tax
and assesses it in the donee's estate. There is no statute, however, providing
for the taxation of contingent interests. See Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass.
588, 93 N. E. 973 (1910).
18 Laws of 1899, C. 76, p. 100.
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It was also provided that if, on the happening of the
contingency or condition, the property should be transferred to a person exempt from taxation, or taxable at
a rate less than that imposed, such person should be entitled to a refund equal to the difference between the
amount paid and the amount which said person should
pay.
It should be observed that section 230 applies generally
to contingent interests and does not specifically mention
powers of appointment. Framed in this general manner,
the foregoing section indicates the intent of the legislature to assess the tax in the estate of the grantor or
testator "at the highest rate" possible upon the happening of any contingency or condition limited in the will, in
order to avoid the possible difficulties in assessing and
collecting an additional tax at the time the contingent
interest ultimately vests.
The first leading case in New York involving the interpretation of these statutory provisions was In re Howe,"
decided in 1903, which held that the inheritance tax was
to be postponed until the exercise or non-exercise of the
power by the donee created a taxable transfer within
the meaning of section 220. The facts of the case were
that Elizabeth L. Howe, the testatrix, created a testamentary trust giving to Leavitt Howe a life estate and a
general power of appointment over the remainder, provided that if there was not a valid exercise of the power
the remainder should go to his children and their heirs.
A similar trust was created for Edward Howe. The
executors of the estate contended that it was the exercise
of the power and not its creation which effected the taxable transfer under the provisions of subsection 5 of
section 220, C. 284, p. 868 of the Laws of 1896, as
14 86 App. Div. 286, 83 N. Y. S. 825 (1903), affirmed in 176 N. Y. 570, 68
N. E. 1118 (1903).
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amended. 15 The State contended, however, that the
amendment of section 230 by the Act of 1899, providing
for the immediate taxation of contingent interests, repealed by implication the section relied on by the executors, and that a tax should therefore be presently levied
at the highest rate. Justice Bartlett, writing for the
court, stated that the amendment did not by implication
repeal section 220, and that the tax should be postponed
until the exercise or non-exercise of the power in the
estate of the donee, thus giving full effect to the fifth
subdivision of section 220 of the New York Tax Law.1"
This case, which is the first expression by an appellate
court in the state of New York under the statutes as then
in existence, annunciates the law in that state until 1911,
at which time both sections 220 and 230 were amended,
the effect of which amendments, according to subsequent
decisions, was to change the law and to supercede the
15 See Matter of Seaver, 63 App. Div. 283, 71 N. Y. S. 544 (1901), and
Matter of Walworth's Estate, 66 App. Div. 171, 72 N. Y. S. 984 (1901),
relied upon by the executors to the effect that it is not the creation but the
exercise of the power which creates the taxable transfer.
16 "The phraseology of this amendment of 1899 is not such as necessarily
to embrace a case like the present, where a testamentary power of appointment is bestowed upon the life beneficiary of a trust ....
It is to be observed
that the amendatory statute. .. makes no change whatever in any section of
the transfer tax law, except section 230. It leaves unchanged section 220,
the fifth subdivision of which, relating to powers of appointment, has already
been quoted. The effect of the amendment, therefore, was the same as
though one statute had been enacted containing subdivision 5 of section 220
and section 230 as changed in 1899. We thus have, in contemplation of law,
an act of the Legislature containing specific directions as to the taxation of
estates in regard to which a power of appointment is conferred upon the
original transferee; and I do not see how it can well be held that a subsequent provision in the same statute in regard to the taxation of transfers
of property where the estates of the transferees are dependent upon contingencies or conditions effects a repeal by implication of the specific provisions
relating to transfers through the instrumentality of the donee of the power.
Neither the Matter of Vanderbilt's Estate, 172 N. Y. 69, 64 N. E. 782, nor
the Matter of Brez's Estate, 172 N. Y. 609, 64 N. E. 958, bears upon the
question in controversy here. Those decisions relate wholly to the effect of
section 230 of the transfer tax law, and the opinions contain nothing in conflict with the views which have been expressed."
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doctrine of the Howe case.17
In 1911 the portion of section 220 providing for a taxable transfer in the estate of the donee upon the omission or failure to exercise the power was stricken.1 8
Section 230 was also amended to provide for the entry
of a temporary order by the surrogate assessing the tax,,
the order to become final after a reassessment upon the
happening of the contingency or condition. 19
It should be noted that there was nothing in the amending act of 1911 which made section 230 specifically applicable to powers of appointment, the general nature of the
section being retained as in its original form.
The amendment to section 220 followed an opinion
handed down by the Court of Appeals in 1905 in Matter
of Lansing,20 which held that the omitted portion was unconstitutional in that it endeavored to predicate a tax
on a transfer which could never take place. 1 In other
17 Prior to In re Howe there was some conflict as to the proper interpretation to be given to the New York statutes. In re Field's Estate, 36 Misc.

279, 73 N. Y. S. 512 (1901), and In re Howell's Estate, 34 Misc. 432, 69 N.
Y. S. 1016 (1901), gave effect to section 220 and postponed the tax, which
principle was subsequently adopted by the Howe case. However, the case of
In re LeBrun's Estate, 80 N. Y. S. 486 (1902), held that the property subject
to the power was presently taxable under section 230 as amended. The court
stated, on the authority of Matter of Vanderbilt, 172 N. Y. 69, 64 N. E.
782 (1902), reversing 68 App. Div. 27, 74 N. Y. S. 450 (1902), and Matter of
Brez's Estate, 172 N. Y. 609, 64 N. E. 958 (1902) (both of which were
discredited by In re Howe) that the transfer subject to tax was the passing
of title or interest out of or from the estate of the decedent, even though the
transferee is not ascertainable at the time, and without regard to how obscure, remote, or contingent the remainder might be. The court stated that
it had not overlooked section 220 in reaching its decision. This may be
seriously questioned.
Is Laws of 1911, C. 732, sec. 1.
19 Laws of 1911, C. 800, sec. 1.
20 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905), modifying 103 App. Div. 596, 92
N. Y. S. 1132 (1905). But see Minot v. Stevens, 207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E.
973 (1911), wherein the constitutionality of a similar provision was upheld.
See also Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (3d ed.), p. 174.
21 Justice Vann, writing for the court, stated: "Where there is no transfer
there is no tax, and a transfer made before the passage of the act relating to
taxable transfers is not affected by it, because, as we held in the Pell case,
such an act imposes no direct tax, and is unconstitutional, since it diminishes
the value of vested estates, impairs the obligation of contracts, and takes
private property for public use without compensation."
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words, if the power were not exercised the transfer
would not take place in the estate of the donee as provided by the statute, but would relate back to the estate
of the donor.
Before considering the cases which arose subsequent
to these important amendments, a qualification of the
rule laid down in the case of In re Howe should be mentioned. In 1912 an opinion was written by the Court of
Appeals in Matter of Burgess,2 2 which limited the postponement of the tax to those cases where the power of
appointment was absolute and it was certain that the
property would pass upon the exercise or non-exercise
of the power. After expressing affirmation of the principle annunciated in the Howe case, the court distinguished the cases on their facts and held that the power
was not absolute, and for that reason taxed the remainder
23
in the estate of the donor.
The effect of the amendment of 1911 was not immediately reflected in the decisions which followed. Except
for the modification made by Matter of Burgess, 4 the
rule established by In re Howe was followed and approved on several occasions.
22 204 N. Y. 265, 97 N. E. 591, modifying 146 App. Div. 348, 130 N. Y. S.
686 (1911).
23 "The embarrassment as to the taxation of the remainders in the residuary estate is caused by the fact that it is not certain whether there will be
any power of appointment to be exercised over the whole or any part of the
residuary estate. The executors are to divide the property into as many
shares as there may be living daughters or issue of a deceased daughter at
the death of the widow. If at such time any daughter shall have died, leaving issue then surviving, such issue will inherit directly under the will, and
not by virtue of the exercise or non-exercise of any power of appointment,
and such inheritance will comprise a part or the whole of the property, dependent on whether any of the other daughters shall survive that period.
If none of the daughters shall live until that time, none will have any power
of appointment. The result would be that, if the rule of Matter of Howe,
supra, was applied to the present case, the remainders might escape taxation
altogether. For that reason, the learned courts below held that the rule
applies only where there is an absolute gift of a power of appointment, so
that the property is certain to pass, either under the exercise or non-exercise
of the power of appointment, and that the case before them was not within
the rule. In this view we concur." 204 N. Y. 265, at p. 270 (1924).
24 Followed by In re Turner's Estate, 143 N. Y. S. 692, 82 Misc. 25
(1913).
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In 1916 the Surrogate's Court wrote an opinion in the
case of In re Neher's Estate,2 5 where the will gave the
life tenant a power of appointment over one-half of the
remainder. It is apparent from the opinion that no
significance was then attached to the amendments which
were subsequently held to change the doctrine of In re
26

Howe.

In the same year In re Moore's Estate 27 held that the
tax was postponed.2 8 As late as 1919 the Surrogate's
Court in the case of In re Stebbins' Estate29 postponed
the tax where the decedent's son had a life estate in onefifth of the residuary estate with a special power of appointment, which was deemed by the court to be absolute
in nature. The Howe case and Matter of Burgess were
cited and relied upon.
It was not until 1921 that it was held that the tax
should be assessed and collected in the donor's estate.
In re Canda'sEstate80 was the first to deviate from the
rule followed by the line of cases heretofore noted. 81 The
Appellate Division, however, held that no tax was due
at all and that there was no need to decide the question
95 Misc. 69, 158 N. Y. S. 454 (1916).
"The one-half of the remainder over which the widow has a power of
appointment is not presently taxable. [Citing Matter of Howe.] The amendment of section 230 of the Tax Law . . . did not change the language of the
statute, so as to make the principle of the decision in the Matter of Howe
inapplicable, as that amendment provided only for the entry of a temporary
order by the surrogate. That part of section 230 which provides for the imposition of a tax at the highest rate was in force at the date of the decision
in the Matter of Howe, supra. Therefore that decision is still controlling,
and a remainder which is subject to an absolute power of appointment is not
taxable until the power is exercised." 158 N. Y. S. 454, at p. 455 (1916).
27 162 N. Y. S. 213 (1916).
28 See also In re Bucki's Estate, 172 App. Div. 455, 158 N. Y. S. 657
(1916).
29 106 Misc. 385, 174 N. Y. S. 487 (1919).
30 114 Misc. 161, 185 N. Y. S. 903 (1921).
81 The court stated: "The amendments of 1911 to section 230 and the
additional provisions for interest or income in favor of the beneficiaries in
section 241 require that the tax shall be presently imposed and not suspended.
There is nothing peculiarly sacred about estates which are transmitted by
means of powers, and there. is no sound reason why they should not be
governed by the same rules which control the devolution of estates by other
methods."
25

26
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as to the time of assessment. 2 The opinion of the lower
court is not, therefore, authority on this point.
In re Duff's Estate" followed shortly thereafter and
reaffirmed the point that the taxable transfer took place
in the estate of the donor, although under the peculiar
circumstances involved it is not a clear-cut authority as
34
to the present taxability in the donor's estate.
The next case decided was In re Trumbull's Estate.5
A trust under the decedent's will was created, a life
estate and a general power of appointment being given
to his son. In default of appointment the remainder was
to go to the issue of the son living at his death. The
court held that the remainder was presently taxable
for two reasons: first, that the power was not absolute
as the donee was not the owner of the legal title under the
real property laws of that state (a factual differentiation fron In re Howe); second, that the amendments to
sections 220 and 230, and the addition of section 24186
by the Act of 1911 effected a change in the law as set
forth in the Howe case. The court stated:
...Section 241 of the Tax Law . .. makes clear the legislative
intent of requiring prompt payment of taxes at the highest rate
at which they may be taxed, and the immediate imposition of
taxes on remainders subject to conditions and contingencies.
Matter of Zborowski, 213 N. Y. 109, 107
N. E. 44, In re Parker's
87
Estate, 226 N. Y. 260, 123 N. E. 366.
By the same amendment in 1911 this legislative purpose was em82 197 App. Div. 597, 189 N. Y. S. 917 (1921).

114 Misc. 309, 186 N. Y. S. 259 (1921).
The donor died in 1904 and the donee in 1918. The power had been
ineffectively exercised. It was held that inasmuch as the order in the donor's
estate did not mention the remainders it was not a binding adjudication as
to the liability for present or future taxation. The court, therefore, decided
the tax was assessable in the estate of the donor because of the unconstitutionality of section 220 as decided by In re Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E.
882 (1905), and that the transfer took place in the estate of the donor.
85 117 Misc. 812, 191 N. Y. S. 759 (1921), affirmed without opinion in
1922 in 203 App. Div. 854, 196 N. Y. S. 956.
36 Discussed later herein.
87 Where reference is made to In re Parker's Estate.
38
84
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phasized by providing in section 230 of the Tax Law for the entry of a temporary order. These amendments, and the recent
decisions of the Court of Appeals, supra, have entirely overcome
the force and reason expressed in the opinion of In re Howe's
Estate,.. . which held that taxation should be suspended where
the power given was absolute. At the time of the latter decision,
subdivision 6 of section 220 of the Tax Law provided for the
taxation in the estate of the donee of the property affected by
the exercise (or nonexercise) of the power. Apparently the
court regarded this language as assuring the taxation of the
property in the grantee's estate only. Subsequent to this decision
in 1904, the Court of Appeals held that the statutory provisions
for the tax in the donee's estate on the nonexercise of the power
were unconstitutional. In re Lansing's Estate, 182 N. Y. 238, 74
N. E. 882. It will be noted that the provisions of section 241
were not effective until July 28, 1911.
The language of the court in the foregoing opinion and
in the two cases following should be carefully noted.
It was in 1922 that the first leading case was decided
in which an opinion was handed down by an appellate
court. In that year the Appellate Division reviewed
the case of In re Cole's Estate.88 The testator had
created a testamentary trust giving to his daughter a life
estate and a general power of appointment over the remainder. In the event there was not a valid disposition
or exercise of the power the remainder was to go to the
daughter's children.
The residuary estate was bequeathed to trustees for the benefit of the testator's son
for life, with a power of appointment over the remainder
of the trust, and to his issue in default of appointment.
The Surrogate held that it was the exercise of the power
and not its creation which provided the taxable transfer
and that the tax, therefore, was not presently payable in
the estate of the donor of the power. This position was
reversed when the case went to the Appellate Division,
the court stating:
38 202 App. Div. 546, 195 N. Y. S. 541 (1922).
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Respondent seeks to sustain that portion of the order appealed
from relating to the present taxability of the remainders by the
decisions in Matter of Howe's Estate,... and Matter of Burgess'
Estate... while it is urged by the appellant under the amendments to the Tax Law (sections 230 and 241), made by chapter
800 of the Laws 1911, and the recent decisions of the Court of
Appeals (In re Zborowski's Estate, . . . ; Matter of Howe's
Estate, supra), which held that taxation should be suspended
where the power given was absolute (Matter of Trumbull's
Estate, . . . ; Matter of Parker'sEstate, . . .), that it is entirely
possible that the powers of appointment will not be exercised,
and that the taxation will therefore ultimately be assessed against
the donor's estate (Matter of Canda's Estate, . . .). The decision
in Matter of Howe's Estate seems to indicate that it is based
upon the ground that section 230 did not by implication repeal
subdivision 6 of section 220 of the Tax Law; but the conclusion
reached by Judge Cardozo, 226 N. Y. 260, 123 N. E. 366, indicates that it was the intention of the Legislature to provide for
the present taxation of remainders limited upon conditions and
contingencies.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the opinion of the Appellate Division.8 9 Because
of the importance of this decision, the full opinion of
Justice McLaughlin pertaining to this question is
quoted.40
Whether the remainders in these two trusts are presently taxable is one of the questions presented. Its solution necessarily
turns upon the construction to be put upon section 220, subd.
6, of the Tax Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60), when the same is read
in connection with section 230 of the same act, as amended by
Chapter 801 of the Laws of 1911. These two sections are, apparently, in hopeless conflict, but, when read in the light of
judicial construction placed upon them, it seems to me that each
can be given full force and effect, and in such a way as not to
make them inconsistent. Undoubtedly, if section 220 be considered in and by itself without reference to section 230, Tax
Law, (Consol. Laws, c. 60; Laws 1909, c. 62), then these remainders are not presently taxable, and a tax cannot be imposed
89 Matter of Cole, 235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733 (1923).
40

138 N. E. 733, at p. 734 ff.
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until the power of appointment has been exercised. (Matter of
Burgess, 204 N. Y. 265, 97 N. E. 591; Matter of Howe's Estate,
86 App. Div. 286, 83 N. Y. Supp. 825; affirmed, 176 N. Y. 570,
68 N. E. 1118.) But after these decisions were made section
230 was amended (Laws 1911, c. 800; Laws 1916, c. 550) so as
to seemingly change the law on that subject, so that section 230,
after those changes were made, provided:
".... When property is transferred in trust or otherwise, and
the rights, interests or estates of the transferees are dependent
upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or
in part created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of said contingencies or conditions, would be
possible under the provisions of this article and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith by the executors or
trustees out of the property transferred, and the surrogate shall
enter a temporary order determining the amount of said tax in
accordance with this provision; provided, however, that on the
happening of any contingency whereby the said property, or
any part thereof, is transferred to a person or corporation exempt from taxation under the provisions of this article, or to
any person taxable at a rate less than the rate imposed and paid,
such person or corporation shall be entitled to a return of so
much of the tax imposed and paid as is the difference between
the amount paid and the amount which said person or corporation should pay under the provisions of this article. .... "
When this statute was enacted the Legislature must be presumed to have known what construction had theretofore been
put upon the statutes by the courts; in other words, it was
charged with knowledge of certain legal principles in framing
the statute. The general rule, as I understand it, is that when
the Legislature amends or enacts anew a statute, it will be assumed that it had full knowledge of all the judicial decisions
theretofore made interpreting the statute as then existing, and
that being so, the new enactment must be read in the light of
such previous interpretation. Orinico Realty Co. v. Bandler, 233
N. Y. 24, 134 N. E. 823; Komanda & Co. v. United States, 215
U. S. 392, 30 Sup. Ct. 136, 54 L. Ed. 249; Ceasar v. Bernard, 156
App. Div. 724, 141 N. Y. Supp. 659, affirmed, 209 N. Y. 570, 103
N. E. 1122.
This view was clearly expressed by Justice Miller, speaking
for this court in Matter of Zborowski's Estate, 213 N. Y. 109,
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112, 116, 107 N. E. 44, 45, where he said: "The Legislature has
unmistakably expressed the intention that all transfers shall be
assessed for the purpose of taxation as of the date of the transfer,
and, however unjust that may be thought to be, it is not open to
In one aspect it may be
objection on constitutional grounds ....
unjust to the life tenant to tax at once the transfer, both of the
life estate and of the remainder, though contingent, and it may
seem unwise for the state to collect taxes which it may have to
refund with interest, but those considerations are solely for the
Legislature, who are to judge whether they are more than offset
by the greater certainty which the state thus has of receiving the
tax ultimately its due under the statute. However unwise or
unjust it may seem in a particular case like this for the state to
collect the tax at the highest rate when in all probability the
remainder will vest in a class taxable at the lowest rate, it is the
duty of this court to give effect to the statute as it is written."
This authority was followed in Matter of Parker's Estate, 226
N. Y. 260, 123 N. E. 366. Each of these remainders, therefore,
was properly assessed, and at the rate stated, and the order
appealed from, to this extent, is affirmed.
The fact that the Court of Appeals stated that section
230 was amended so "as to seemingly change the law
on that subject" should be carefully noted. It should
also be observed that the court has quoted from and relied upon Matter of Zborowski's Estate and Matter of
Parker'sEstate as indicating the intention of the Legislature in amending the Tax Law. A further discussion of
these salient features of this decision is reserved at this
41
point.
The most recent case arising in New York overruling
the decision reached in the Howe case is In re Davison's
Estate, decided in 1929.42 The important issue in the
case involved the question of perpetuities which is not
here discussed. The facts of the case were that the
testator set aside two-thirds of his estate for the creation
of trusts, one share to go to each child surviving him,
41
42

These matters will be mentioned later herein.
134 Misc. 769, 236 N. Y. S. 437 (1929).
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or if any child predeceased him to the children of such
child per stirpes. Upon the death of each beneficiary
his portion was to be divided among his children, provided, "Should he leave none, or should any child of
mine or child predeceasing me die leaving no such child,
then I direct that the respective shares or portion be
paid unto the person or corporation in such manner, as
the last beneficiary of the income of such share or subshare shall direct by duly executed and probated last
will and testament, and in default of such appointment,
or insofar as the same, if made, shall not be effectual
then such share or subshare shall be paid to the persons
who shall then constitute the heirs at law of such last
The opinion of the court with reference
beneficiary."
to the question involving the power of appointment is
brief, and is quoted in full.
There remains for consideration on this phase of the problem
only the question of the death of a primary or secondary life
tenant without issue, which is the phase of the matter involving
the propriety of the transfer tax assessment. If any life tenant
leaves issue, such issue will take under the terms of the will;
the taking being either in trust or outright, depending on the
considerations just discussed. Failing such issue, however, the
life tenant is given a power of appointment, the manner of
exercise of which cannot presently be determined, and which,
conceivably, may be in favor of a person in the 5 per cent class.
Thus it is entirely possible that any one of the present life beneficiaries might have no children living at his or her decease
(Ruth D. Stewart has none at the present time), and that he
might exercise the power of appointment in favor of a stranger.
It follows, therefore, that the remainders are presently taxable
at the highest rate. Tax Law, sec. 230, Matter of Cole's Estate,
235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733; Matter of Ken'y's Estate, 133 Misc.
Rep. 718, 233 N. Y. S. 681; Matter of Sperling's Estate, supra.
[133 Misc. 834, 234 N. Y. S. 119 (1928).]
It is to be noted from the short opinion that the court
has not entered into an independent discussion of the
principles involved, and has considered the question
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closed by the authorities cited. The real basis for this
opinion is found in Matter of Cole, inasmuch as the last
two cases cited by the court are foreign to the subject at
hand and do not involve the question of the present
taxability of a power of appointment.
After examining all of the New York cases on this
subject which have effected a reversal of the doctrine
adopted in the Howe case, one may justifiably ask upon
what basis In re Howe has been overruled. Much has
been said in the opinion referred to as to the effect of
sections 230, 241, 222 and the cases of Matter of Zborowski's Estate and Matter of Parker'sEstate, and although
section 220 as amended in 1911 has been mentioned, the
full significance of its terms and provisions has been
overshadowed by the repeated references to other statutory provisions and cases which, it is submitted, have
no effect upon the question at all. Quotations have been
made freely, and in many instances at length, for it
is believed that the vagueness of the opinions can be most
convincingly presented in that fashion.
Upon what basis has In re Howe been overruled?
What is the effect of the amendments to section 230?
What is the effect of sections 222 and 241? After we
have attempted to answer these questions, we shall undertake to discuss in greater detail the provisions of
section 220 as amended in order to show that the correct
basis for nullifying the Howe case lies in and only in
the amendment to this section. The political and social
philosophy to be extricated from the other provisions
of the statute mentioned may justify the ultimate decision in view of the fact that the state is assured greater
certainty in the collection of the tax,"3 but this philosophy
does not seem to be sufficiently cogent to warrant and
justify its application as the principal basis for the
48 See Kidder, State Inheritance Tax and Taxability of Trusts, p. 58,
wherein he discusses some of the hazards incurred in postponing the tax.
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change made in the face of express statutory regulation
with reference to powers of appointment.
In re Trumbull's Estate was based upon the amendments to sections 241 and 230, which together with "the
recent decisions of the Court of Appeals, have entirely
overcome the force and reason expressed in the opinion
of In re Howe's Estate." (It was first decided by the
court, however, that the power of appointment under
review was not absolute, and that Matter of Howe's
Estate, therefore, "would in no event be applicable to
this estate for there the power was absolute.") The recent decisions referred to are In re Parker'sEstate and
Matter of Zborowski's Estate.
The Parker case, however, is not authority for the
question under consideration inasmuch as the court was
there concerned only with the question of whether the
contingent remainder should be added to the residuary
estate, both of which might conceivably vest in the same
person, in computing the amount of tax presently pay44
able.
44 A testamentary trust was established, the income from which was to go
to Edith Parker for life, and at her death to her issue then living, and to the
children of any issue who predeceased her per stirpes, for life. Each child
or grandchild who survived to receive his or her share had a power of
appointment over his or her portion of the estate. In default of appointment
the remainder was to go to their heirs. The residuary estate was bequeathed
to John H. Parker, a nephew, including all lapsed legacies. The residuary,
therefore, might include the principal of the trust in-the event the life tenant
died without issue. The question before the court was whether for purposes
of taxation at the highest rate the residuary and the remainder should be
added together and taxed to the nephew.
A portion of Justice Cardozo's opinion, which is frequently cited and
quoted, is as follows: "Remainders are to be appraised at their present
value. . . . They are gifts, like present interests. In fixing their value, no
distinction is to be drawn between the classes of remainders, whether vested
or contingent. For the purposes of taxation, the contingency is eliminated,
and the gift is classed as absolute. . . . The value of other gifts to the same
legatee must be reckoned in computing the tax when the remainder is vested.
The method of computation is not different when the remainder is contingent.
It is argued that in providing against contingencies, we should limit ourselves to those that the testator may be supposed to have foreseen. We
need not stop to inquire whether that is so. There is nothing to show that
this contingency was not foreseen by the testator, and covered by his will.
He might have said, in so many words, that the nephew should receive the
remainder in default of issue of the life tenant. He said the same thing in
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Nor is the case of Matter of Zborowski's Estate,
cited and relied upon, support for the decision reached,
as the court is there only confronted with the taxation of
remainders generally, contingent and vested, and does
not deal with a power of appointment at all.4 5 The consideration of that general question, of course, does not
call for a construction and interpretation of the amended
portion of the statute dealing with powers of appointment, with which we are primarily concerned.
Although the dicta extracted from Matter of Parker
and Matter of Zborowski, regarding the desirability of
the state's collecting at the earliest possible date the
greatest amount of tax which may be due under any contingency, may sound convincing in its general scope, it
bears no weight in application in the light of the factual
circumstances of the cases in question.
The only statement made by the court in the Trumbull
case with reference to the amendment to section 220 was
that In re Howe regarded that section in its original
form "as assuring the taxation of the property in the
effect when he provided that his nephew should be the residuary legatee.
Gifts have the same value whether they are stated separately or collectively.
The rate of taxation does not vary with the paragraphs of scriveners.
"This construction of the statute maintains the consistency of the law
and its singleness of purpose. The state has secured itself against all contingencies, remote as well as probable. That is the dominant scheme, which
it is our duty to preserve. In the case before us, the contingency is in all
likelihood remote, and so the mind rebels a little against the tying up of
money. But in other cases it may be less remote, and the need of protection greater. Whether in improbable contingencies the risk justifies the
burden it is not for us to say. That is a question for the Legislature. Our
duty is done when we enforce the law as it is written." Matter of Parker,
226 N. Y. 260, 123 N. E. 366 (1919), reversing 185 App. Div. 300.
45 The income of a residuary trust was to go to the son of the testatrix
until he reached the age of 21, at which time he was to receive the principal.
If the son should die before reaching 21, the principal was to go to his issue,
and if no issue, to named persons who were in the highest taxable class.
The court referred to section 230 and stated, on page 112: "The Legislature
could not have used plainer language to express a purpose to impose a tax
on all transfers immediately upon the death of the transferor regardless of
the fact that particular transfers may be of contingent estates in remainder
which may not ultimately be taxable at all." Matter of Zborowski's Estate,
213 N. Y. 109, 107 N. E. 44 (1914), reversing 163 App. Div. 947. See also
portion of opinion quoted by the court in In re Cole's Estate, supra.
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grantee's estate only," and that the omitted portion was
declared unconstitutional after the decision in the Howe
case was handed down. There is no discussion as to the
effect the remaining portion of section 220 might have.
The second leading case, In re Cole's Estate, is likewise based upon In re Parker's Estate and Matter of
Zborowski. That the court has been confused and has
given undue consideration to the general language in
those two cases is obvious from the opinion itself.
The court recognized the conflict which existed between
sections 230 and 220, and stated that if the latter were
considered by itself the remainders could not be presently taxed, citing Matter of Burgess48 and In re Howe's
Estate. In the next sentence, however, the court stated,
"But after these decisions were made, section 230 was
amended... so as to seemingly change the law on that
subject." The court therefore held that the temporary
order provision of the 1911 amendment to section 230
completely overruled the effect of section 220 in its
amended form. The suggested uncertainty would seem
to be warranted in view of the inapplicability of that
section of the statute as subsequently pointed out. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals is unsatisfactory in clearly establishing the basis upon which it is founded, and
were it not for the opinion written by the Appellate Division 7 the decision would be lacking in merit.
The third and last leading case, In re Davison's Estate,
refers to section 230 and Matter of Cole's Estate to support the decision. The other two cases cited, Matter of
Kenly's Estate,8 and Matter of Sperling's Estate,9 are
as foreign to the subject under discussion as the Zborowski case, none of which involves the taxation of a power
of appointment.
46 Supra, n. 22.

47 202 App. Div. 546, 195 N. Y. S. 541.
48

133 Misc. Rep. 718, 233 N. Y. S. 681 (1929).

49

133 Misc. Rep. 834, 234 N. Y. S. 119 (1928).
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What is the effect of the amendments to section 230
of the New York Tax Law? The principal alteration
in section 230 made by the amendment of 1911 was the
addition of the provision that "the surrogate shall enter
a temporary order determining the amount of said tax
in accordance with this provision." The remaining provisions of this section provide that within six months
after the happening of the contingency or condition upon
which the remainder is limited, the representative of the
estate shall make application for a final determination
of the tax. In the event the tax as redetermined is less
than that originally paid, a refund of the difference is
to be made. Provision is also made for the deposit of
a bond to cover any subsequent assessment in the event
the personal property is less than the amount of tax required in the first instance. After the final determination, the court is to enter a "final" order assessing the
tax.
Considerable importance has been attached to the
"temporary order" provisions of this section by the
cases referred to. 0 Whatever may be the name, the procedure in the final analysis is not different from that
employed in Illinois where the original order is final in
its nature but is subsequently abrogated when the tax
is reassessed and finally determined upon the happening
of the contingency or condition. The original order in
each instance accomplishes the necessary results and is
sufficiently elastic to allow modification and a final determination at a later date.
The procedural provisions of section 230 maybe significant in many respects, but the manner in which they
change the substantive provisions of other sections is not
apparent from the statute itself or from the judicial comments which have been made. As was said by the court
50 See particularly Matter of Cole, 235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733 (1923).
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in the matter of In re Neher's Estate."' "The amendment
of section 230 of the Tax Law... did not change the language of the statute so as to make the principle of the
decision in the Matter of Howe inapplicable, as that
amendment provided only for the entry of a temporary
order by the surrogate."
What does seem significant in this section is the absence of any reference to powers of appointment. Had
the Legislature intended to include all cases involving
a power of appointment within the general provisions of
section 230, it would have used express language of inclusion. The absence of specific exclusion of this class
of contingent remainders certainly does not imply inclusion in view of the fact that powers of appointment
are specifically dealt with in section 220.
It is submitted that the amendment to section 230 providing for the entry of a temporary order did not warrant the construction and effect given to it-that the
tax in all instances should be presently assessed in the
estate of the donor.
What effect have sections 222 and 241 of the New York
Tax Law? These two sections which have been cited
and relied upon have no effect upon the principle involved. Section 241 was amended in 1911 to provide that
the Tax Commission shall deposit in a sound bank all tax
monies which are collected on contingent interests at the
highest rate, and shall hold the same until the contingency or condition occurs, at which time the amount by
which the tax as finally determined exceeds the amount
of the deposits is to be turned over to the representative
of the estate, and the balance, if any, is surrendered to
the State Treasurer. 2 It was the purpose of the amend51 Supra, n. 25.
52 It is unfortunate that provisions similar to those in section 241 are not
to be found in the Illinois Act. Many of the difficulties encountered in obtaining refunds, and the objections on behalf of the life tenant as to the loss
of income from the amount deposited, are satisfactorily eliminated.
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ment to this section to eliminate the objection commonly
raised that the assessment at the highest rate inflicts a
hardship on the life tenant. In entering the temporary
order the court determines the lowest and the highest
taxes possible under the contingencies expressed in the
will, the difference between these two sums bearing interest while deposited. The increment from the interestbearing portion is paid to the executor of the estate who
in turn distributes it in accordance with the provisions
of the will.5 8 This provision is a successful expedient in
surmounting the objectionable difficulties formerly incident to the collection of the tax at the highest possible
rate. Its scope is general, however, and aside from indicating the intent to eradicate administrative difficulties
in the assessment, it would seem to have no more application to those cases involving a power of appointment
than the provisions of section 230 which deal with contingent remainders generally.
Section 222 provides that the tax on any interest limited, conditioned, or dependent upon a contingency or future event, so that the fair market value thereof cannot
be ascertained at the time of the transfer, shall accrue
when the beneficial interest vests in possession or enjoyment. This section was in substantially the same form
at the time the Howe case was decided. It is obvious
after a cursory examination that the contingencies referred to in section 222 are dependent upon the property
to pass and not the person to take.
It is impossible, therefore, to see any effect these two
sections have upon the specific question with which we
are concerned, and a further discussion of them is not
deemed requisite.
What is the effect of the amendment to section 220 of
the New York Tax Law? Section 220 in its original form
53 See Matter of Bryan, 218 App. Div. 436, 218 N. Y. S. 551 (1926), and
Matter of De Cordova, 199 App. Div. 492, 192 N. Y. S. 11 (1922).
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provided that a taxable transfer should be deemed to
take place in the estate of the donee either upon the exercise or non-exercise of the power. The latter portion
as we have seen was declared unconstitutional by Matter
of Lansing and then repealed in 1911. In spite of the
repeated utterances as to the effect of other statutory
provisions with reference to the doctrine of Matter of
Howe, we can, in considering the amendment of 1911 to
section 220 establish the basic principle upon which the
present New York law is predicated.
The remaining portion of section 220, dealing with the
taxable transfer by the exercise of the power of appointment, is still in effect, and under its terms the transfer
from the donee is for tax purposes the one subjected to
the duty. No statutory change whatsoever has been
made which affects the treatment of this class of taxable transfers.
The unconstitutionality of the non-exercise portion of
section 220 has reinstated the common law doctrine, and
upon the non-exercise of the power the property passing
thereby is rightfully considered as taxable in the estate
of the donor, from which the passage of ownership or
beneficial interest to the appointee actually takes place.
In the event there is no default clause in the instrument
creating the power, the property passes by intestate succession in the donor's estate if there is a failure to or
defective exercise of the power. In the absence of specific authority to the contrary, this devolution must control
for tax purposes as well. If there is a remainder over
in the event of non-exercise, the transfer is still effected
in the donor's estate and must there be taxed.
There is little difficulty in applying the theory of section 230 to this situation, and this must be readily admitted. It will be recalled Matter of Howe decided that
section 230 did not impliedly or inferentially overrule and
render impotent the provisions of section 220, and that
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the specific language of the latter with reference to
powers of appointment must therefore govern. By virtue
of the 1911 amendment, the force and reasoning of Matter of Howe has been restricted and limited to the side
of the question dealing only with the transfer effected by
the exercise of the power. The difficulty in applying
section 230 to a transfer by reason of the non-exercise
having been eliminated by the amendment, it necessarily
follows that to the extent the doctrine of Matter of Howe
has failed, section 230 has been given effect.
This seems to be the only reasonable interpretation to
be put upon the provisions of section 220 as amended,
and its real effect upon the rule of the Howe case would
be to limit its application to those cases where there is
a general power of appointment and there is no possibility of assessing the tax upon the assumption of non-exercise of the power. Its application has therefore been
restricted to the point of practical extinction.
With but one exception, the New York decisions discussed have held the tax should be assessed upon the assumption of non-exercise. In re Trumbull's Estate" involved a general power of appointment with a default
clause in favor of the son's issue living at the time of his
death. There is not one word in the opinion indicating
that the court enterfained the thought that it was possible to assess the tax on the assumption of exercise. The
second question raised on appeal by the executor was that
"the order improperly provides that the remainder interest should be taxed against the 5 per cent. class, instead of the 1 per cent. class." To this question the court
replied:
The appeal upon this ground is sustained. No provision was
made in the will of decedent for the disposition of the remainders
in case his son should die without issue and without having
exercised the power of appointment. In this contingency the
54 191 N. Y. S. 759 (1921).
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estate would vest as a reversion in the son as the sole next of
kin of decedent. . . . Under the donor's will, the remainders,
therefore, must ultimately pass to a person in the 1 per cent.
class .... The tax should therefore be fixed at that rate, and the
order should be modified accordingly. 55
Since a general power had been granted to the donee,
the tax could have been assessed to a stranger had the assumption of exercise been resorted to. It clearly appears, therefore, that the tax was there assessed upon
the assumption that the power would not be exercised,
although the court has not in so many words made the
distinction.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in the case of
In re Cole's Estate,56 considers only the question of the
present taxability and does not mention the assumption
upon which the tax is based. The court does, however,
indicate that it affirmed this method of assessment by
stating: "Each of these remainders, therefore, was properly assessed, and at the rate stated. . ... "I By referring to the opinion of the Appellate Division in the same
case, there can be no question as to the decision of the
court, for it is there stated, "I am therefore of the opinion that the surrogate erred in failing to provide for the
present taxation of the remainders limited upon the default in the exercise of the powers, and of issue....1,,1s
Although the Surrogate in the case of In re Canda's
Estate59 was overruled by the Appellate Division," on
the ground that no tax was due at all under the facts
presented, he had correctly interpreted the statute in
assessing the tax upon the assumption of non-exercise.
It would seem from the foregoing authorities that it
55 Ibid, p. 761.

The 1% and 5% classes were the lowest and highest

classes respectively under the New York Act.
56 235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733 (1923).
57 138 N. E. 733, at p. 734.
58 195 N. Y. S. 541, at p. 546.
59 185 N. Y. S. 903.
60 Matter of Canda's Estate, 197 App. Div. 597, 189 N. Y. S. 917 (1921).
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should have been well settled in New York that the tax
could only be presently assessed upon the assumption of
non-exercise after the 1911 amendment to section 220.
However, the most recent case, In re Davison's Estate,61
reached a contrary decision, the court stating that it was
entirely possible that the power would be exercised in
favor of a stranger in the 5 per cent class, and that the
remainders were therefore taxable at the highest rate.62
This antithetical decision cannot be harmonized with
the cases already pointed out, but it should be kept in
mind that it is an opinion of the Surrogate's Court, whereas In re Cole's Estate was passed upon by the Court of
Appeals, and In re Trumbull's Estate was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division.
By way of summary, therefore, the law of the State of
New York may be stated as follows: The inheritance tax
upon transfers of property passing under a power of
appointment is to be presently assessed in the estate of
the donor upon the assumption of non-exercise of the
power.
After reviewing and discussing the cases arising in
New York, the full significance of People v. Linn,"
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, can be more
readily appreciated. It should be remembered that since
the adoption of section 25 into our Inheritance Tax Law
in 1909, which section provides for the immediate taxation of contingent interests at the highest rate, the
general practice followed in this state has been to impose
the tax in the estate of the donor of the power at the
highest rate which, under the contingencies or conditions
surrounding the remainder interest, could be assessed
upon the assumption of exercise or of non-exercise. Certain instances have been mentioned by others in which the
61 134 Misc. 769, 236 N. Y. S. 437 (1929).
62

See opinion quoted ante.
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357 Ill. 220, 191 N. E. 450 (1934).
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tax was postponed, but they constitute the exception and
not the rule. People v. Linn was the first decision in Illinois subsequent to the addition of section 25 to pass upon
the question with which we are concerned, and for that
reason great importance is attached to it.
On April 21, 1934, the Supreme Court handed down
its opinion in the Linn case in which it was decided that
a power of appointment was not taxable in the estate of
the donor at the highest rate, but that the tax was to be
postponed until the exercise or non-exercise of the power
created a taxable transfer in the estate of the donee.
William R. Linn, the testator, died January 28, 1930. Under the terms of his last will and testament, residuary
trusts were created for the benefit of his two daughters,
Mabel and Dorothy, who were given life estates and general powers of appointment over their respective trusts.
The provisions of the two trusts with reference to the
powers of appointment are identical, the paragraph applicable to the trust for Mabel Linn being as follows:
(c) Upon the death of my daughter Mabel said trustee shall distribute and pay over the principal of said trust estate to whomsoever my daughter Mabel shall by her last will and testament
appoint to receive the same, and in default of such appointment
then to her issue living at the time of her death in equal shares
per stirpes. If my daughter Mabel shall die intestate and fail
to appoint said trust estate by will and shall leave no issue surviving her, then said trustee shall distribute and pay over said
trust estate to my issue surviving at the date of the death of my
daughter Mabel, in equal shares per stirpes, and in default of
such issue then to the persons who at the date of the death of my
daughter Mabel would have been my heirs-at-law under the laws
of the State of Illinois then in force if I had died intestate.
The County Court of Cook County had presently assessed the tax on the remainders to a nephew of the decedent. From this decision the executors of the estate appealed. The principal contention of the executors on appeal, which was sustained by the court, was that under
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subsection 4 of section 1 of the Illinois Inheritance Tax

Law, the remainders which were subject to the powers of
appointment were not presently taxable, but that the tax
should be postponed, determined and collected in the
estates of the donees of the powers. The controversy
which created the important issue in the case was the construction to be placed upon that subsection in the light of
section 25 of the same Act. Subsection 4 of section 1 of.
the Illinois Act as then in effect, was identical with section 220 of the New York Tax Law prior to the amendment of 1911, and provided that the taxable transfer was
deemed to take place in the estate of the donee upon the
exercise or the non-exercise of the power.64 Section 25 of
our law was also copied from section 230 of the New York
statute as it existed prior to 1911, and its provisions as
to the taxation of contingent interest at the highest rate
5
are substantially the same.6
The Illinois court, after considering the two sections
above mentioned, decided that section 25 was qualified
by subsection 4 of section 1, stating the familiar rule that
the legislative intention is to be gathered from an entire
act and not from a particular section thereof, and that
one portion of an act may be intended to qualify, extend,
64

See ante, where section 220 of the New York Tax Law is quoted.

Sec. 25. "When property is transferred or limited in trust or otherwise, and the rights, interest or estates of the transferees or beneficiaries are
dependent upon contingencies or conditions whereby they may be wholly or
in part created, defeated, extended or abridged, a tax shall be imposed upon
said transfer at the highest rate which, on the happening of any of the said
contingencies or conditions, would be possible under the provisions of this
Act, and such tax so imposed shall be due and payable forthwith by the
executors or trustees out of the property transferred; Provided, however,
that on the happening of any contingency whereby the said property, or
any part thereof is transferred to a person, corporation or institution exempt
from taxation under the provisions of the inheritance tax laws of this state,
or to any person, corporation or institution taxable at a rate less than the
rate imposed and paid, such person, corporation or institution shall be entitled to a reassessment or redetermination of the tax and to a return by the
State Treasurer of so much of the tax imposed and paid as is the difference
between the amount paid and the amount which said person, corporation or
institution should pay under the inheritance tax laws, with interest thereon
at the rate of three per centum per annum from the time of payment." Ch.
120, sec. 419, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933.
65
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limit or abridge other portions." Since the provisions of
subsection 4 are special in nature, and have reference
and application to a specific class of transfers, it was
decided that the generally inclusive provisions of section
25 are to that extent qualified. It is difficult to argue
that a portion of the act which specifically provides that
all transfers effected by the exercise or non-exercise of a
power of appointment are to be taxed in the estate of the
donee, should be harmoniously applicable with a provision of the same act which in general and broad terms
provides that wherever a contingency controls the vesting
of interest or possession a tax should be presently collected at the highest possible rate.
Importance was also attached to section 3 of the Illinois Act, which provides that all taxes imposed by the
act "unless otherwise herein provided for, shall accrue
and be due and payable at the death of the decedent,"
indicating that the Legislature had intended that there
should be a postponement of the tax under certain circumstances.
Having determined that section 25 and subsection 4 of
section 1 were conflicting, and that the provisions of the
latter relating specifically to powers of appointment
should prevail over the general language of the former,
the decision of the court would seem to be well reasoned
and correct. It will be remembered that, although In re
Howe's Estate interpreted the effect of the addition of
section 230 by the amendment of 1899 subsequent to the
incorporation of section 220 in the Tax Law, and reached
the same conclusion as did People v. Linn, it was there
66 Citing 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d ed.), sec. 368; People v.
Donohue, 276 Ill. 88, 114 N. E. 513 (1916) ; Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 271
Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128 (1915) ; People ex rel. Dinneen v. Bradford, 267 Ill.
486, 108 N. E. 732 (1915); Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N. E. 837
(1915) ; People ex rel. Cameron v. Flynn, 265 Ill. 414, 106 N. E. 961 (1914);
People v. The William Henning Co., 260 Ill. 554, 102 N. E. 530 (1913)
People v. Price, 257 Ill. 587, 101 N. E. 196 (1913) ; Belleville and Illinoistown R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20 (1853).
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stated that the effect of the amendment "was the same as
though one statute had been enacted containing subdivision 5 of section 220 and section 230."' Thus, the fact
that in Illinois section 25 and subsection 4 of section 1
were adopted concurrently in 1909 does not alter in any
way the argument resorted to in the Howe case.
The court next considered the relationship between the
Illinois and New York statutes, and after referring to
the sections hereinbefore discussed stated:
These apparently conflicting provisions were construed in the
case of In re Howe, 86 App. Div. 286, 83 N. Y. Supp. 825; affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 176 N. Y. 570 ....

The State

contended that the enactment in 1899 of the provision which
corresponds to section 25 of the Illinois act repealed by implication the provision which is the counterpart of sub-section 4 of
section 1 of our act. The court held that the amendment of 1899
did not repeal or render nugatory the section enacted in 1897,
and that the remainders over which the sons had absolute powers
of appointment were not taxable until the deaths of the donees.
...

There is no expression or even manifestation of a legislative

intent that the provisions of our act under review were not enacted in the light of the construction given them by the courts of
the State of New York. When a statute is adopted from another
state, the judicial construction previously placed on the statute
by the courts of that State accompanies it, and is treated as incorporated therein....
The appellee maintains that the contrary construction of the
New York statute now obtains, and that the Howe case, supra,
has been overruled by later decisions. The provisions of the
New York act, adopted in sub-section 4 of section 1 and section
25 of our Inheritance Tax Act in 1909, were amended in New
York in 1911 ....68
It is manifest that the subsequent amendments to the Inheritance Tax Law of New York differ essentially from the corresponding provisions of the Illinois act in effect on January 28,
1930, the day William R. Linn died. Sub-section 4 of section 1,
postponing the tax on the transfer of property subject to powers
of appointment, had not been changed at that time and differed
67

See n. 16 ante.

68 The court here stated the changes made by the amending act of 1911.
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materially from the New York law then in effect. The statutory
provisions relating to the imposition of inheritance taxes upon
transfers subject to powers of appointment were the same on
January 28, 1930, as when originally adopted in 1909 from the
New York law. At the date of the death of the testator, William
R. Linn, section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Act was still limited
by sub-section 4 of section 1, and, accordingly, the remainders of
the testamentary trusts over which his daughters have absolute
powers of appointment were not presently taxable.
The analogy between the statutory provisions in effect
at the time In re Howe and People v. Linn were decided
makes the similarity of these two decisions strikingly
apparent. In each instance the statute provided that the
taxable transfer should be deemed to take place in the
estate of the donee upon the exercise or non-exercise of
the power, and in each instance the specific treatment
of powers of appointment was held to be unaffected by
the sections providing for the taxation of contingent interests generally at the highest rate. Inasmuch as In re
Howe had so construed the New York Act prior to the
adoption of similar provisions in Illinois in 1909, the
principle of statutory construction resorted to by the
court in People v. Linn is convincing and conclusive.
The decision of the court in the Linn case seems to be
well reasoned and correct upon the theory that section
25 is modified and limited by the specific provisions of
sub-section 4 of section 1, and is equally sound in the application of the rule of statutory construction referred to.
The issues presented were properly decided and the statutory provisions then in effect were properly construed.
Chief Justice Orr, who was joined by Justice Farthing,
dissented from the majority opinion stating that the tax
should be presently assessed in the estate of the donor.69
Since the decision in the Linn case has been announced,
69 The dissenting Justices wrote a vigorous opinion in support of their
contention. Although this belief was not accepted by the majority of the
court, it evidences a decided disagreement with the position herein submitted
as the logical basis for future decisions, and for that reason merits mention
at this time.
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the question has often been asked, "What is the present
practice followed in this state as to the taxation of
powers of appointment?" The inheritance tax on transfers subject to a power of appointment is now being presently assessed in the estate of the donor at the highest
possible rate under the contingencies and conditions expressed in the will. It is immaterial whether the highest
possible tax is produced by an assumption of exercise or
non-exercise, for either assumption may be resorted to
as a means to the desired end.
Two recent cases which were before the Inheritance
Tax Office of Cook County, illustrate the position taken in
dealing with this class of transfers. In one estate, 70 two
Justice Orr takes the position that there is no conflict between subsection
4 of section 1 and the provisions of section 25. Divergence from the majority
upon this score is fundamental and presages possible future difficulties depending upon the persuasiveness of his argument to the other members of
the bench in the light of the 1933 amendment. He states that section 25 is
unlimited in scope, whereas subsection 4 of section 1 is concerned only with
transfers in the estate of the donee. If it is true as he believes that the
latter section is not applicable in the estate of the donor, there can be no
question as to the applicability of section 25 in all cases. When the transfer
mentioned in subsection 4 of Section 1 is effected by the exercise or nonexercise of the power in the estate of the donee, there will be a redetermination and refund if necessary so that he contends both sections may be harmoniously and concurrently applicable. He states that if this were not the
intention of the Legislature, express language of exclusion would be found
in section 25.
If there is no conflict between these two sections, it was erroneous for
the majority of the court to invoke the rule that particular and specific provisions of the act must prevail over those more general in character. This
conclusion, of course, necessarily follows the premise already established.
Justice Orr endeavors to negative the significance attached to In re Howe
by the majority, in stating that the New York Court was principally concerned with the question of whether the adoption of section 230 impliedly
overruled the provisions of section 220, stating, "It thus appears that the
taxation of remainders subject to powers of appointment in estates of donors
was not before the court... in the Howe case."
Justice Orr further states that In re Howe was overruled by Matter of
Cole, Matter of Parker, In re Davison's Estate, and Matter of Zborowski,
and that "In the later decisions above cited, the New York courts, notwithstanding the specific provisions of subdivision 5 of section 220 (corresponding to the first part of our subsection 4 of section 1), imposing a tax on the
exercise of a power of appointment by a donee, held that a remainder subject
to a power of appointment is taxable in the first instance in the estate of the
donor under sections 230 and 241, on the assumption that the donee might
exercise the power in favor of a stranger."
70 Inheritance Tax Case No. 27164.
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testamentary trusts were created, the income to be paid
to cousins of the testatrix for life, and the remainders to
pass as they by will should appoint. In default of appointment, the remainders were limited to named persons,
who were in fact children of the life tenants. The tax
was assessed upon the remainders in each instance to
one child of the life tenant of each trust, being one of the
individuals to whom the remainder had been limited in
default of appointment. 7 '
Another estate reviewed in this county shortly after
the one just referred to illustrates the tax being assessed
upon the assumption of exercise to a stranger.7 2 A life
estate was given to a widow with remainders over to the
testator's children. In the event the widow survived all
of the beneficiaries named, she was to have a power of
appointment over one-third of the entire estate. There
was no default clause in the will. The tax was levied
upon the theory that the widow would survive all the
named beneficiaries and would appoint to a person who
was a stranger in blood to the testator.73
The reason for the variance and inconsistency in method in the above estates cannot be explained in theory, but
the latter represents the strict rule of assessments at the
highest rate and is now unqualifiedly stated to be the
71 It should be pointed out that in People v. Linn the tax was originally
assessed upon the assumption of non-exercise to a nephew (the default clause
in the will limiting the remainder to persons in the first or second classes).
In both of these cases the greatest possible tax could have been assessed by
taxing to a stranger.
72 Inheritance Tax Case No. 27167.
73 The common law rule and the practice followed in this state is that the
relationship of the appointee to the donor governs. Subsection 4 of section 1
provides that the exercise of the power shall be deemed a taxable transfer
in the same manner as though the property "belonged absolutely to the
donee." It would seem, therefore, that the relationship to the donee should
control where the tax is levied upon the transfer effected by the exercise of
the power. See the following cases so holding: Matter of Rogers, 71 App.
Div. 461, 75 N. Y. S. 835, 172 N. Y. 617, 64 N. E. 1125 (1902); Matter of
Walworth, 66 App. Div. 171, 72 N. Y. S. 984 (1901) ; In re Seaver's Will,
63 App. Div. 283, 71 N. Y. S. 544 (1901). For the common law rule see
Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (3d. ed.), p. 171, citing Galard v.
Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909).
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practice adopted by the members of the Attorney General's office in charge of inheritance taxation. It is unfortunate that in neither of the instances referred to was
the tax sufficiently large to warrant a contest and an
appeal to the Supreme Court. The desire to make law
must yield to the exigencies and financial expediencies
involved in any case.
We have considered only general powers concerning
which, by way of summary, we may state that the assumption of exercise in practically all cases will be made,
as it is then possible to tax the remainder to a stranger.
Where a special power has been given, the highest possible tax will still be assessed under section 25, but the
assumption upon which it is based may vary. For instance, a power may be limited to A, B, and C, all of
whom are in the first or second class for tax purposes,
and in default of appointment to D, E, and F, who are
also in the same class. It makes no difference here
whether the tax be assessed upon the assumption of exercise or non-exercise, and either may be used as a basis
for the tax. On the other hand, if F happened to be a
stranger, the tax would be levied upon the basis that
there would be a default in appointment, and that D and
E predeceased F. It has been a common belief by
many that the tax will be assessed only upon the assumption of exercise, and by others upon the assumption of
non-exercise. There is no justification for this misunderstanding under the present practice, and it is certain
that whichever assumption affords the highest possible
tax under the theory of section 25 will be indulged in by
the officials levying the tax.
As to decedents dying prior to July 1, 1933, the doctrine of People v. Linn is now controlling, and the tax
will be postponed. By reason of the amendment striking out the non-exercise provision of subsection 4 of section 1, the authorities in this state have looked to the New
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York decisions, and have evolved the system of taxation
herein discussed to be applied to those estates wherein
the decedent died subsequent to July 1, 1933, the effective date of the amendment. It is submitted, however,
that the interpretation given the decisions of that state
is not correct to the extent that a tax may here be assessed upon the assumption of exercise.
What effect should properly be given the amendment
of 1933 to subsection 4 of section 1 in the light of People
v. Linn? No specific change has been made in the law as
to those cases where the power is exercised, and there is
no implication that a change was intended in the remaining portion of the section by the amendment of 1933. It
is still required by the statute that in the event of exercise, the taxable transfer shall be deemed to take place in
the estate of the donee in the same manner as though the
property belonged absolutely to him. This would necessitate the tax being postponed and collected in the estate
of the donee, except in those cases where the assessment
can be made upon the assumption of non-exercise. The
contradiction which existed at the time the Linn case was
decided, between section 25 and the exercise provision
of subsection 4 of section 1, still exists. The argument
used by the court in that case so far as the exercise of
the power is concerned, seems to be available and applicable at this time. It does not seem logical to read into
the amendment an implication that any change was intended so far as the exercise of the power is concerned.
On the contary, the omission was identical with that made
in New York in 1911, and as we have seen, with the exception of Davison's case, the decisions have limited the
effect of the amendment to the non-exercise of the power.
The amendment of 1933 reinstates the common law
doctrine as to those cases where there is a failure to exercise the power, so that the taxable transfer now takes
place in the estate of the donor, and if it were not for the
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provisions of section 25, the tax would be postponed in
accordance with the practice prior to 1909.
It has been suggested that the similar amendment in
New York modified and limited the ruling of In re Howe to
those very few cases where the tax could not be assessed
upon the assumption of non-exercise. This theoretical
conclusion is applicable in this state as well. It clearly
should not be assessed upon the assumption of exercise,
because in that event the taxable transfer takes place in
the donee's estate by virute of the exercise provision of
the statute still in force. A specific illustration will emphasize this. A creates a testamentary trust, giving a life
estate to B with a general power of appointment, there
being no default clause. When the estate is reviewed for
inheritance tax purposes, the possibility that B might appoint to a stranger should not be the basis for assessing
the tax immediately, as section 1 says the taxable transfer is to be in the estate of the donee. The tax should be
assessed, therefore, upon the assumption that B will not
exercise the power, and applying section -25, the tax may
be presently levied at the highest possible rate under the
circumstances. Now, suppose that a default clause has
been attached whereby the donor provides that in the
event the power is not exercised the property shall pass
to X, Y, and Z, or the survivor of them. Again the tax
would properly be levied on 'the assumption of nonexercise of the power and that X and Y would predecease
Z, who would thereby take the entire remainder.
If the default clause provided that the remainder go
to a local charity, it would follow that no tax would be
presently assessed in the donor's estate, as the local charity would be exempt. Since no tax would be due at all
in the event the power were not exercised, the assessment
could only be made in the estate of the donee upon the
exercise of the power. This appears to be the only instance where no tax is to be presently assessed and levied
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in the estate of the donor, assuming that the tax cannot
properly be predicated upon the assumption of exercise.
So long as subsection 4 of section 1 provides that the
taxable transfer in the event of exercise of the power is
deemed to take place in the estate of the donee, no other
general theory as to the taxation of powers of appointment consistent with its presence seems logical. The
conflict between section 25 and the foregoing provision is
as obvious now, as it was prior to the amendment, and
it is this fact which makes convincing the interpretation
of the amended section which has been submitted that
the tax cannot be presently levied upon the assumption
of exercise. However, since the non-exercise provision of
subsection 4 of section 1 has been stricken, there exists
no conflict between section 25 and the theory that the tax
can only be assessed upon the assumption of non-exercise,
and the provisions of the latter section therefore may
now be applied.
If the Supreme Court, in reviewing this question when
it is again presented on appeal, is to give any credence to
its opinion in the case of People v. Linn, it should agree
with the conclusion reached herein. The court cannot
give full force and effect to the theory of that decision in
all cases involving a power of appointment, inasmuch as
the amendment to subsection 4 of section 1 has eliminated
entirely the argument employed that the tax should be
postponed in cases where the taxable transfer takes place
by reason of the failure to exercise the power. Nor, on
the other hand, can it be logically decided that the tax in
all instances should be presently assessed in the estate
of the donor, for the argument resorted to in deciding
that the tax should be postponed is still correct with reference to the remaining portion of the section and is not
affected by the nature of the amendment in 1933. If both
of these premises are sound, and it is believed that they
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are in the light of this discussion, the only course open to
the court is to hold that the tax cannot be presently
assessed upon the assumption of exercise. To this extent
the rule in People v. Linn should be modified.
If the practice now employed by the taxing officials of
this state is subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court,
in every instance where a power of appointment has been
given, the tax will be presently assessed in the estate of
the donor at the highest possible rate. This means, of
course, that a large sum of money will be tied up during
the existence of the preceding particular estate, thus
diminishing the income to be paid to the life tenant. In
most instances the interest paid by the state on any refund eventually obtained cannot compensate for this loss
to the life tenant.
Should the Supreme Court, however, adopt the course
submitted as the logical basis for its opinion, the tax
would be presently assessed upon the assumption of nonexercise in all cases. Under such a ruling, of course, it is
possible to avoid the onerous assessment to a stranger by
carefully limiting the phraseology of the default clause.
Where the use of a power of appointment is advisable,
a special power limited to named persons or a class affords more opportunity to guard against the undesirable
features of section 25 than the general power. If the
power be limited to the children of the life tenant, to
his descendants, or to such other persons as the testator
may desire, and coupled with such a provision is a default
clause with similar provisions, the scope of the contingencies involved is narrowed down to a desirable point.
The testator may limit the remainder to the natural objects of the donee's bounty or to his own preferences,
and name individuals who are in the first and second
class for taxation purposes. Where the remainder is
limited to a class in lieu of named persons, section 25, of
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course, will be applied to tax the entire remainder to one.
Where the special power is used, the same theory is
applicable to the exercise as well as the non-exercise provisions of the instrument, and each should be so framed
as to limit the remainder to those in the first or second
class.
Another great advantage to be gained by the use of a
special power lies in the fact that for Federal Estate Tax
purposes, the property passing under a special power
will not be subject to tax in the estate of the donee."'
Property passing under a general power of appointment,
however, is subjected to a Federal Estate Tax in the
donee's estate.75
It should be specifically pointed out that the possibility
exists, although it is not here considered logical, that the
desire of Justice Orr and Justice Farthing to interpret
the existing statutory provisions as warranting the present taxability in all cases in the donor's estate, may be
adopted by other members of the bench when the matter
is again presented to the Supreme Court, and that no
credence will be given to the theory of the argument used
in the majority opinion in People v. Linn. In such event
the decision of the court would permit the taxation in
the donor's estate upon the assumption of exercise, which
in turn opens the door to taxation in the third class in
those cases where a general power has-been used. It is
to be noted that the dissenting opinion in the Linn case
cited with approval In re Davison's Estate, in which the
New York court upheld the assessment in the donor's
estate upon the theory of the exercise of the power to a
stranger. In order to avoid unfortunate complications in
the event such a decision is forthcoming, a special power
should be employed rather than a general one in all cases
where it may be used satisfactorily.
74

See Article 24, Federal Estate Tax Regulations 80.

75 Ibid.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE ELECTRICAL UTILITIES

The tremendous growth of interstate transmission of electric
energy in the last decade' has given rise to conflicting claims to
jurisdiction for taxing and regulating purposes. This conflict
characterizes the present chaotic taxing system with its fortynine independent taxing authorities intermingled with number2
It
less local bodies exercising similar functions and powers.
also emphasizes the need for revising the current methods of
taxing.
Only by implication are the states forbidden to burden interstate commerce. 8 However, the grant of power to the national
government was early held to imply a converse prohibition upon
state authority. 4 This was not a total prohibition, but only such
as was necessary to protect interstate commerce from being unduly burdened. 5 Obviously, property used in interstate commerce
is not, per se, exempted from the taxing power of the state, but
may be taxed, provided, of course, there is no discrimination.$
Railroads were the first interstate utilities to question the
methods of allocating their property for taxation purposes
among the various taxing units through which their lines extended. The courts first evolved the formula of the "unit rule";
I In 1933, for example, the national average for electricity delivered outside
the state in which it was generated was about 20 per cent. Deliveries outside their boundaries varied among the states from 97.7 per cent for Maryland and 74.5 per cent for Virginia, at one extreme, to 3 per cent for Missouri
at the other. More power crossed state lines in 1933 than was generated in
the entire country in 1913. See table on "Interstate Electrical Energy Transactions during 1933," in the Interim Report of the National Power Survey,
Federal Power Commission, 1935, at p. 46. See also the map facing p. 6
showing "Principal Generating Plants and Electrical Transmission Lines of
the United States in 1934."
The principal interconnected networks or power areas include such units as
(1) Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode
Island; (2) Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey; (3)
Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia and Tennessee; and, (4) the Pacific coast
states.
2 See Charles E. Merriam, The Government of the Metropolitan Region
of Chicago (1933).
8 "The Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate commerce . . .
among the several states . . ." United States Constitution, Act. I, sec. 5,
clause 3.
4 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
5 Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phil. et al., 12 How. 299 (1851).
6 See W. U. Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530 (1888); Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Postal Tel. Cable Co.
v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688 (1895) ; U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321 (1918). But compare Alpha Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
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that is, each state in determining the value of property subject
to its taxing power may find a value bearing the same proportion to the value of the entire property as the length of the railroad or telegraph or telephone lines within the state bears to the
total length of the carrier system. 7 Such a formula must obviously be one of convenience, not of inevitable application. 8 If.
the court finds that it seems to operate inequitably in a particular
case, its application will be pronounced violative of due process.
The general unit rule has long been applied to telephone and
telegraph lines.9 However, the decisions are not yet clear regarding its application to interstate electrical utilities. In NevadaCaliforniaPower Company v. Hamilton,10 more than two-thirds
of the value of the corporation's total property was represented
by property and property rights in California, including the
power plant and water rights; less than one-third of the value
was represented by property in Nevada. However, approximately 85 per cent of the transmission lines was in Nevada while
the other 15 per cent was in California. Nevada imposed a tax
computed on 85 per cent of the use value of the corporation's
property on the theory that a like proportion of the corporation's income was derived from its holdings in Nevada. It appeared that the State of California had actually taxed the cor7 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, and Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, cited n. 6.
In Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897), the rule was modified to the so-called "unit of use" formula: Property of an interstate carrier
may be assessed for purposes of taxation at that value which, as a unity or
single system, it has in use, to-wit, the net profits which it produces, irrespective of what may be the value of the tangible property which is owned or
employed, apportionable as the amount of business done within the state is
proportioned to the total amount of business done.
8 See Pitt., etc., Railway Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894), where
the large mileage in one state was over land where the construction cost
was low and terminal facilities few and inexpensive, while in another state
its mileage was small, but of expensive construction, with elaborate terminal
facilities. See also Union Tank Line Co v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919) ;
Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66 (1920) ; and New York Tax Commission,
Special Report on Allocation of Corporate Income (1933).
9 See W. U. Tel. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 91 Mont. 300, 7 P.
(2d) 551 (1932), where the court treated landlines and ocean cables as an
integral system. But compare Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U. S. 133
(1930), where the court (for rate-making purposes) treated the telephone
company as a "segregated enterprise," although it admittedly had the advantages attached to being a component part of a large system and through
such relations obtained codperation with the manufacturing, research, engineering and financing departments of the holding company.
10 240 F. 485 (1917), aff'd in 264 F. 643 (1920). Also see 235 F. 317
(1916).
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poration on the same theory, that is, on 15 per cent of the use
value of the total property. The Federal district court, later
affirmed by the circuit court, declined to approve such method
of apportionment, saying, "If the property in this case were
homogeneous, that is, if it consisted entirely of one transmission
line, if it were a telephone line, a telegraph line, or a railroad,
it would be proper to pursue the method which has been used
by the commission. . .. "11 This case, thus, may consequently be
explained in terms of these particular facts. Yet, are not these
precise facts characteristic of any interstate electrical transaction, where the generating plant is in one state and the transmission and distribution lines spread through several states? The
court frowned on this attempt to tax property, the actual tangible value of which is situated outside the state by computing
12
the tax on the proportion of transmission lines within the state.
However, the states have more than made up for this lost
ground by developing a newer kind of tax, a tax upon the generation or distribution of electricity itself, without regard to
the technical questions of the value of the network system. And,
the Supreme Court of the United States has sustained it.
In Utah Power and Light Company v. Pfost,18 a Maine corporation, doing business in Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming as a
generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical utility, was
subjected in Idaho to a license tax measured by the production
of electricity, whether consumed inside the state or sent out, at
the rate of one-half mill per kilowatt hour. The argument was
made by the utility company that the generation and transmission of electricity was an instantaneous act, with no noticeable
time differentiation, for electricity travels at the speed of approximately 186,000 miles per second. Transmission of electrical
11 At p. 489.
12 Line 6. Compare State v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853, 293 S. W. 399 (1927),
involving an intercounty (i.e., intrastate) electrical utility, where apportionment on a mileage basis was approved. See also State v. State Board of
Equalization, 56 Mont. 413, 186 P. 697 (1920).
Note that this limitation against taxing property beyond the jurisdiction
of the taxing authority (as imposed by the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment) has never been applied to the Federal government. Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933). Theoretically this decision is directly contrary
to First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932), except that the former
involved international aspects, in which there is as yet no final judicial
arbiter.
18 286 U. S. 165 (1932). See Sidman I. Barber, "State Taxation of
Electrical Generation for Interstate Transmission," 3 Idaho L. Jour. 1-11
(1933); Robert L. Howard, "Gas and Electricity in Interstate Commerce,"
18 Minn. L. Rev. 611 (1934).
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energy in interstate commerce is exempt, as such, from regulation by the state, 14 and hence it may be assumed, from the state
taxing power. It was urged that since there could be no difference between generation and transmission-distribution, the law
should not make one. Consequently, it was argued, a state tax
imposed indiscriminately upon such generation is violative of
the commerce clause. But, the court reminded counsel that, in
spite of all the scientific evidence as to the nature of electricity,
"taxation is a practical matter." The court observed a distinction between the generation of electricity and its transmission in
interstate commerce. The one was essentially a process of manufacture, and consequently precedent (in terms of logical analysis,
if not in terms of fact) to the process of interstate commerce,
and therefore subject to the taxing power of the state.1 5 The
electrical utility was consequently found to be engaged in two
activities, legally separable. So far as it produced electrical energy in Idaho, its business was purely intrastate, subject to state
taxation and control. But, in transmitting the electricity across
the state line into Utah, the utility assumed the character of an
interstate business regarding which state legislation is subject to
the paramount authority of the commerce clause. Mr. Justice
Sutherland, in speaking for the court, said:
"While conversion and transmission are substantially instantaneous, they are, we are convinced, essentially separable and distinct operations. The fact that to ordinary observation there is
no appreciable lapse of time between the generation of the
product and its transmission does not forbid the conclusion that
they are, nevertheless, successive and not simultaneous acts....
The effect of turning the switch in Utah is not to draw electrical
energy directly from the waterfall, where it does not exist except
as a potentiality, but to set in operation the generating appliances in Idaho, which thereupon receive power from the falling
water and transform it into electrical energy. In response to
what in effect is an order, there is production as well as transmission of a definite supply of an article of trade .... We think,
therefore, it is wholly inaccurate to say that appellant's entire
system is purely a transferring device. On the contrary, the
generator and the transmission lines perform different functions,
with a result comparable, so far as the question here under conPub. Util. Comm. v. Attleboro Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
15 U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895), where the court said.

14

"Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not part of it."

NRA decision.

Compare the
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sideration is concerned, to the manufacture of physical articles
of trade and their subsequent shipment and transportation in
commerce ....
The evidence amply sustains the conclusion that
this transformation must take place as a prerequisite to the use
of the electrical product, and that the process of transferring, as
distinguished from that of producing, the electrical energy, begins not at the waterfall, but definitely at the generator, at which
point measuring appliances can be placed and the quantum of
electrical energy ascertained with practical accuracy."
The full logic of this case received its application in South
16
Carolina Power Company v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
where a Federal district court sustained a tax imposed upon the
sale (that is, distribution) of electricity by the state to which it
had been transmitted, as well as a generating tax. The court
reasoned that neither tax violated the commerce clause, for one
was imposed before, and the other after, the process of interstate commerce. The transformer was singled out as of decisive
importance-so much so, in fact, that it was suggested that the
electricity taxed at the generating plant and at the distributing
plant (at opposite ends of the process, so to speak) were different commodities of commerce from the electricity passing
through the transmission lines (which was admittedly in interstate commerce), for in the latter case the electricity was in
high voltage. In each instance the tax was imposed upon low
voltage current. And the court cited as analagous the principle
of "breaking the original package." The court said:
"Electricity is produced at a low voltage. For transmission
over long distances it is 'stepped up' by a transformer to a very
high voltage; and all of the current transmitted in interstate
commerce is thus 'stepped up' before transmission in such commerce. Before it can be used by the consumer, it must be 'stepped
down' again to a low voltage; and all of the current received by
complainants in interstate commerce is thus stepped down before being sold to or used by the consumer. And this 'stepping
up' or 'stepping down' is not a mere change produced in the
current ....
The principle of the transformer is that the current
flowing in the wires coming into the transformer sets up an
induced current ... to flow in the wires going out of the trans16 52 F. (2d)
515 (1931), affirmed without opinion in 286 U. S. 525
(1931). It was in this case that Millikan, the physicist, filed his elaborate
affidavit in support of the view that the generation and transmission of

electrical energy were essentially the same process-that they were instantaneous. See same case in 60 F. (2d) 528 (1932).
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former; the voltage depending upon the relative number of the
coils of the wires carrying the current in and those carrying
the induced current out. These wires are insulated from each
other, and the current going out is not the current coming in, but
a new and different current, although induced by the former....
The current produced by induction in the transformer results
from the use of the original current but is not that current, just
as current produced by steam results from the use of coal but
is not the coal.
"Now, so far as the production or generation tax on current is
concerned, there can be no question as to its validity as applied
to current transmitted in interstate commerce, we think, even
though the current transmitted be conceived of as the identical
current produced. The production of an article for transmission
in interstate commerce is not in itself such commerce. "17
Generation and distribution taxes, measured by the amount
of electricity generated or sold, thus are now clearly subject to
state taxation, regardless of the interstate origin or distribution
of the energy in question. For purposes of taxation, the courts
have fashioned a fictitious concept of electricity. A legal fiction
is not intrinsically bad, that is, it is not necessarily evil or useless merely because it has no basis in reality. In fact, the his17 The courts have sensed a varying analogy between natural gas and
electricity, and have frequently cited cases concerning the former kind of
energy, in bearing upon problems concerning the latter, which may have
some value in view of the relative scarcity of definite precedents in the field
of electrical utility taxation.
In Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927), a state tax imposed on natural gas at the producing well was sustained, although a considerable portion of the gas so taxed was actually transported outside the
state for consumption.
In East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465 (1931),
an excise tax imposed on corporations engaged in supplying natural gas to
consumers within the state was sustained, although based on the gross receipts which included sales of gas piped in from other states. Analagous to
the transformer, was found the pressure-reducing station through which the
natural gas must pass before distribution. The "original package" doctrine
was cited.
Note that while the court has thus sustained the taxation of both electricity
and natural gas at the place of production, it has, on the other hand, held
that the state has no regulatory power over the rates charged by local utilities for energy sold for use in another state and delivered at the state
boundary, although admittedly the rates to local consumers might be adversely affected by the inadequacy of the former rates. See Public Utilities
Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).
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tory of the common law can be traced largely in terms of the
rise and fall of fictions. So long as they perform some function
which facilitates the accomplishment of objectives commanding
general approval they are undoubtedly beneficial and necessary.
But, when the attempt is made to extend their scope beyond
the point of utility, they are no longer justified. To put it simply,
18
legal concepts, or fictions, have only functional validity.
In respect to certain situations, the Supreme Court of the
United States, observing the dangers of multiple taxation as
applied to intangible personalty, has forcefully rejected it and
favored one taxing authority.' 9 Such restraints, however, in
connection with interstate electrical utilities are not yet in appearance. In fact, it is just this mode of piecemeal construction
and rectification by individual cases such as are here commented
upon that has made the American tax structure into a virtual
crazy-quilt. What is really the same kind of economic wealth
(electrical energy) may now be taxed by at least three taxing
authorities, the state of generation, the state of distribution, and
the national government.
If the taxing authorities, in their constant search for revenue,
proceed farther in the direction indicated, grave economic dangers may arise. Unless these authorities, from national government down to the smallest special district, arrange for some
workable division among themselves of the tax income from the
interstate electrical utilities, the business of transmitting power
across state boundaries will be threatened with disintegration.
CLIFFORD J. HYNNING
WHEN COMPOUND INTEREST IS CHARGED AGAINST A TRUSTEE'

In a late Connecticut case2 an administrator, authorized by
the court to continue decedent's business for six months, man18 See Karl N. Llewellyn, "Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222; Edward S. Robinson, Law and the
Lawyers, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935); Jerome Frank, Law and
the Modern Mind, (New York: Brentano's, Inc., 1930).

19 See Robert C. Brown, "Multiple Taxation by the States-What Is Left
of it?" 48 Harv. L. Rev. 407 (1935).
1 For collections of digested cases, see notes in 55 A. L. R. 950, 37 A. L. R.
468, 29 L. R. A. 622. See also George Gleason Bogert, The Law of Trusts
and Trustees (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Pub. Co., 1935), III, 2081-2157;
Frederick Albert Lewin, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (Philadelphia: Blackstone Pub. Co., 1888), I, 464; Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise
on the Law of Trusts and Trustees, (5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1890), I, 667.
2

State ex rel. Raskin v. Schachat et al., 180 A. 502 (Conn. 1935).
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aged it for a much longer time without attempting to liquidate.
He paid himself a salary, and utterly failed to keep intelligible
accounts. In an action on his bond by his successor, the estate
being insolvent, the court charged him with lost principal, and
with compound interest thereon from the time when liquidation
should have been completed. Following a custom prevailing in
decisions upon the question whether simple or compound interest should be allowed against a defaulting trustee, the court
cited but a few3 of the host of cases touching the subject, and
refrained from theoretical explanation of its holding.
Investigation discloses ample authority consonant with this
upon similar facts, and an irreconcilable conflict, both in theory
and decision, on the general question of whether simple or compound interest should be charged. Several reasons appear.
First, the matter is one which is left to the sound discretion of
the court, a discretion which reacts differently to varying situations. 4 Second, compound interest was a new remedy against
trustees in the nineteenth century. 5 Naturally its development
could not be uniform in all jurisdictions. Third, a single fact,
unimportant at first glance, may be the controlling element in a
case. Thus, where the smallness of the fund might have precluded the trustee from keeping it at interest, the court may
refuse to assess compound interest in an otherwise proper case. 6
Factual considerations have been decisive of most of the cases,
and no principle capable of general application has yet been
evolved. But so many decisions have passed upon the question
that the factual grounds for allowing compound interest may
be outlined.
The most common case is that in which the trustee uses trust
funds for his own benefit, as in his own business. It is settled
that the cestui que trust may elect to take the profits actually
realized. 7 But, as a prerequisite, the profits must appear. If the
trustee has lost money, or has failed to keep accounts, no profits
can be made to appear. Numerous decisions accord in allowing
8 Clement v. Brainard, 46 Conn. 174 (1878); Clement's Appeal from
Probate, 49 Conn. 519 (1882); State v. Culhane, 78 Conn. 622, 63 A. 636
(1906) ; Mathews v. Sheehan, 76 Conn. 654, 57 A. 694 (1904).
4 Dixon v. Storm, 5 Redf. Sur. 419 (N. Y., 1881); Wright v. Wright,
2 McCord's Eq. 185 (S. C., 1827).
5 Re Ricker, 14 Mont. 153, 35 P. 960, 29 L. R. A. 622 and note (1893).
6 Barney v. Saunders, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047 (1853).
7 Windmuller v. Spirits Distributing Co., 83 N. J. Eq. 6, 90 A. 249 (1914).
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the cestui compound interest under these circumstances.$ In one
of these, in which the trustee, empowered to enforce security,
foreclosed and bid in the property for himself, and later sold at
a profit, the court remarked: "The rule seems to be, that in all
cases where the trustee has used the trust fund, and the court
can see from the evidence that the trustee has realized large
gains and profits to himself, and has failed to keep any exact
account of the same, or has refused to render an account to the
beneficiary, the law will require him ... to account for the original fund so used, with interest computed with annual rests." 9
This "rule" just quoted was perfectly adapted to the case
before the court, but falls far short of the limits of the cases
charging compound interest against a trustee who has used the
funds of his trust with the aim of personal gain without accounting. It leaves out the cases where the trustee has actually lost
money, and the decided cases indicate that this is no obstacle
to awarding compound interest. 10 It also omits cases wherein
the trustee attempted, but failed, actually to use the fund. A
leading case has held that a trustee who invested in "speculative" stocks, with the acquiescence of the beneficiaries, and then
held the title in his own name, should be charged compound
interest, though he clearly derived no pecuniary benefit from
this breach. 1 ' The improper investment alone was not enough
to surcharge him; the taking of title was the decisive element,
as it revealed his personal object. The only common factual
ground for this group of decisions seems to be actual or attempted private gain. Other misdeeds seem only to add to the
propriety of the remedy.
An offense closely similar to attempted use of trust funds by
the trustee is mingling of funds with his own. Mingling alone,
8 White v. Sherman et al., 168 Ill. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897); Lehman
et al. v. Rothbarth, 159 Ill. 270, 42 N. E. 777 (1896) ; Ogden v. Larrabee, 57
Ill. 389 (1870); Bond et ux. v. Lockwood, 33 Ill. 212 (1864); Clement v.
Brainard, 46 Conn. 174 (1878) ; Montjoy v. Lashbrook et al., 41 Ky. (2 B.
Mont.) 261 (1842); Bobb v. Bobb et al., 89 Mo. 411, 4 S. W. 511 (1887);
Lathrop v. Smalley's Ex'rs, 23 N. J. Eq. (8 C. E. Green) 192 (1872) ; Page's
Ex'r v. Holman, 82 Ky. 573 (1885) ; Hurd v. Goodrich, 59 I1. 450 (1871) ;
Hannahs v. Hannahs, 68 N. Y. 610 (1877) ; note in 29 L. R. A. 628; Long
v. Neeland, 118 Cal. App. 203, 4 P. (2d) 815 (1931).
9 Ogden v. Larrabee, 57 I1. 389 (1870).
10 Asey v. Allen et al., 124 Ill. 391, 16 N. E. 865 (1888) ; Attorney General v. Alford, 4 De G. M. & G. 843, 43 E. R. 737 (1855) ; Gould v. Gould,
126 Misc. 54, 213 N. Y. S. 286 (1925); Long v. Neeland, 118 Cal. App. 203,
4 P. (2d) 815 (1931).
11 White v. Sherman, 168 ll. 589, 48 N. E. 128 (1897),
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without some other element, such as bad faith, does not justify
a court in allowing compound interest. Thus, in a recent case,
a corporate trustee which acted in good faith in allotting a mortgage already held in its own name, to a specific trust, without
transferring title to itself "as trustee," was held liable to beneficiaries only for funds taken from the trust with simple interest. 12 And in another case, an individual trustee who mingled
trust funds with those of the corporation of which he was a
member, was not surcharged because he took care to keep the
fund invested, and made no attempt to benefit the firm. 13 But
in an Illinois case, an assignee for the benefit of creditors mingled
trust money with his own, failed to keep accounts, and refused
to pay a dividend to the plaintiff, a creditor. Since he could not
show that he had not profited, the court presumed that he had,
and charged 1 4him compound interest from the time the claim
was payable.
In all these cases of mingling or attempted use, the familiar
principle that a trustee shall not profit from his trust has been
applied. And where the facts have been strong enough to impute
to the trustee an intent, in handling trust funds, to consider his
own interest at the expense of his trust obligation, compound
interest usually has been assessed. But inconsistent results are
reached because courts differ as to what facts warrant imputing
such an intent to the trustee.
Another important group of decisions involves the failure
to make proper investments. By far the great majority of these
deny compound interest if the breach has been the making of
unsafe or improper investments, or failure to invest at all. 1
Such conduct has been called "simple neglect." To distinguish
from this the action which they conceive to be ground for allowing
compound interest, courts have used such discordant phrases as
"gross negligence," "positive misconduct," "gross delinquency," and "willful violation or omission of duty." As no
12

In re Yost's Estate, 316 Pa. 463, 175 A. 383 (1934).

18 Cornet v. Cornet, 269 Mo. 298, 190 S. W. 333 (1916).
But see Forbes
14 Asey v. Allen et al., 124 Ill. 391, 16 N. E. 865 (1888).
v. Ware, 172 Mass. 306, 52 N. E. 447 (1899), where no bad faith was shown.
Also see McDonald v. Hartford Trust Co., 104 Conn. 169, 132 A. 902
(1926) ; Brown v. Tydings, 149 Md. 22, 130 A. 337 (1925).
15 In re Herbein's Estate, 2 Woodw. Dec. 132 (Pa. 1864) ; Smith and
Barber, Ex'rs, v. Darby, 39 Md. 268 (1873) ; Ames v. Scudder, 83 Mo. 189
(1884); Hamilton v. Reese, Adm'r, 18 Ga. 8 (1855); Purdy v. Johnson, 78
Cal. App. 310, 248 P. 764 (1926); Carter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 165 La.
478, 115 So. 62 (1928); State Street Trust Co. v. DeKalb, 259 Mass. 578,
157 N. E. 334 (1927).
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two courts would define these terms in the same way, no uniformity of decision can be expected, and none is found.
A New York court last year held that a trustee, who had only
the normal trust duty to invest, and who loaned funds on an
unsecured note which proved worthless, could have earned at
least 4 per cent compounded had he invested in Liberty Bonds
at the time he made the loan, and charged him at this rate.' 6
In a Wisconsin case, a trustee who renewed a second mortgage
note on a farm, and ultimately lost the entire investment, was
charged with only simple interest at the legal rate from the
time his duty to convert accrued. 17 But in a leading Illinois
case an executor, directed by will to sell real estate and invest,
and required to account, held the money without investing, and
failed to account. The court charged him 6 per cent, compounded.' 8
Failure to discharge a duty fixed by the trust instrument has
been used as a basis for imposing compound interest, in contradistinction to failure to discharge certain general duties that
are imposed on all trustees, where simple interest only is
charged. 19 Duties fixed by statute are placed on the same basis
as duties fixed by the trust instrument. Thus non-compliance
with the statutory requirements for investments by guardians
and conservators has been a ground for surcharging them for
20
unsuccessful investments.
"The principle of liability," one court has said, "is accountability for what has been received, or ought to have been received, or must be presumed to have been received, and not
punishment for a breach of duty." 21 But in an earlier opinion
the United States Supreme Court remarked that "Interest is
of damages for
compounded as a punishment, or as a measure
22
undisclosed profits and in place of them."
16 In re Ayvazian's Estate, 153 Misc. 467, 275 N. Y. S. 123 (1934).
17

Estate of Dreier, 204 Wis. 221, 235 N. W. 439 (1931).

Is Hough v. Harvey et al., 71 Ill. 72 (1873).

19 Emmet v. Emmet, 17 Ch. D. 142, 50 L. J. Ch. 341, 29 W. R. 464
(1881); Feltham v. Turner, 23 L. T. 345 (1870). The same result is
reached where a court order imposes a duty to sell and invest: Winder v.
Diffenderffer, 2 Bland 166 (Md., 1829); Crimp v. First Union Trust &
Savings Bank, 352 Il1.93, 185 N. E. 179 (1933).
20 People v. Birket, 342 Ill. 333, 174 N. E. 388 (1931) ; Hughes et al. v.
People, 111 Ill. 457 (1885).
21

Forbes v. Ware, 172 Mass. 306, 52 N. E. 447 (1899).

22

Barney v. Saunders et al., 57 U. S. (16 How.) 535, 14 L Ed. 1047

(1853).
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The principle upon which compound interest has been assessed
undoubtedly is accountability for what has been, ought to have
been, or must be presumed to have been received. But the courts
award only simple interest where the trustee, by failing to invest
properly, cannot account for what "ought to have been received."
And they compound the interest against him where, again failing
to invest, and to account for what "ought to have been received," he also shows bad faith by taking title in his own name.
Clearly, compound interest is not always charged where it
ought to have been received. Nor is it always charged when it
has been, or may be presumed to have been, received. It is safe
only to say that it may be charged when one of these three
alternatives exists.
The principle is accountability, but the measure of accountability depends on the degree of the trustee's offense. The object
is not alone to restore to the beneficiary what he has lost. Obviously he loses equally by improper investments whether the
trustee takes title to himself or not. Compound interest is not
charged alone as the measure of damages flowing from the
trustee's breach. Its propriety depends not wholly on the
plaintiff's loss, but mainly on the defendant's act. Therefore, it
is imposed, with few exceptions, as a penalty. The factual
ground for it, common to the overwhelming majority of the
cases, is the trustee's breach of his foremost duty of absolute
fidelity to his trust.
C. E. Fox
AMENDMENTS TO ILLINOIS ATTACHMENT ACT

One of the more important modifications in the statute law of
Illinois made in the last session of the legislature, of especial
interest to the practicing attorney, is the rather thorough and
complete revision of several phases of the Attachment Act.'
The first modification is an enlargement of the action to cover
tort as well as contract cases, and to cover unliquidated as well
as liquidated claims.2 The nine grounds which serve as a basis
for attachment, however, remain unchanged. 8 Attachment suits
are extended so that they may be used in place of attachment in
aid, which action is specifically repealed ;4 yet it seems that this
modification allows the same remedy under a different name.
1
2

Il. State Bar Stats. (1935), Gb. 11.
Ibid., par. 1.

8 Ibid.

4 Ibid., par 31.

NOTflS AND COMMENTS

Having granted attachment in the case of tort or unliquidated
claims, the legislature was faced with the problem of determining a manner in which to fix a bond. Paragraph 2 of the Act
has been amended to accomplish this.5 In substance, it requires
that the plaintiff shall apply to a judge of a court of record or
a master in chancery, to have the usual affidavit as to the amount
of damages indorsed by such officer, and section 4 6 of the old
Act is repealed and sections 4A 7 and 4B 8 supplied to take its
place, which sections require a bond in double the sum sworn to
be due ;9 or the court or a judge thereof upon ex parte motion,
without notice, may authorize a bond in double the value of the
property to be attached instead of double the sum sworn to be
due.10
The conditions of the bond required are substantially the same
as before, with the provision that it shall run to all parties who
may be interested, not only to the defendant named in the writ.11
Attachment against a joint debtor is as formerly. 12 The general
procedure under the Act is, insofar as is possible, brought under
the Civil Practice Act. 13
A forthcoming bond in double the value of the property attached is permitted in the same manner as formerly.14 Other
sections of the Act as to a suit on a bond, sustenance of live
stock, disposal of perishable property, remain unchanged. 15 The
declaration is now a complaint and the Practice Act applies as
far as expedient.' 8 Interveners may appear in much the same
manner as formerly, except that here, too, the rules under the
Practice Act control the procedure.' 7 A set-off is now termed a
counterclaim.' The paragraph in aid of scire facias is specifically repealed.' 9 Despite the fact that attachment in aid is specifically repealed, the statute permits proceedings in aid and
5 Ibid., par. 2.
6 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933), Ch. 11, par. 4.
7

Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 11, par 4 (1).

8 Ibid., par. 4 (2).

9 Ibid., par 4 (1).

10 Ibid., par. 4 (2).

11 Ibid., par. 5.
12 Ibid., par. 7.
Is Ibid., par. 26.
14 Ibid., par. 14.
15 Ibid., par. 18, 19, 20.
16 Ibid., par. 25, 26.
17 Ibid., par. 29.

Is Ibid., par. 30.
19 Ibid., par. 32.
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gives further weight to the argument that only the name in such
21
proceedings is changed. 20 Appeal is as in other civil cases.
The new and vital elements of proceedings in attachment are
actions on tort or unliquidated claims, and the manner of fixing the amount of the bond.
It would seem from a reading of the statute, before judicial
interpretation has been given, that all the rights and remedies
which were open to litigants under the prior Act still exist,
with provisions added to cover more types of causes.
J. E. BRUNSWICK
VENUE FOR CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT-STATUTORY

CHANGE

At the last session, the Illinois legislature amended the Civil
Practice Act 1 in such manner as to require application for confession of judgment to be made "in the county in which the note
or obligation was executed or in the county where one or more
of the defendants reside."
The statute declares expressly the effect of failure to select
the proper venue: "A judgment entered by any court in any
county other than those herein specified shall have no force or
validity, anything in the power to confess to the contrary notwithstanding."
This amendment, of course, represents a distinct change in the
procedural law of Illinois, and while it is hardly susceptible of
misunderstanding or needy of interpretation, it is considered
worthy of brief mention, because of the commonness of the proceeding and the possibility that in reliance upon settled custom
it may be inadvertently overlooked if special attention is not
directed to it.
G. S. STANSELL
20
21

Ibid., par. 33.
Ibid., par. 40.

1 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1935),

Ch. 110, par. 174.

